I'm waiting for the report on this one, but in this situation I think they were pretty much doomed, with a small chance of recovery if they responded correctly immediately. The 22 is not an aerobatic aircraft, during training one of the slides they show you is the affect of the wing blocking airflow to the rudder during a spin, versus other aircraft which have much more authority during the spin. It can recover, but my impression is that it would take more altitude than an aero rated aircraft.
For the chute, we are trained on take off to land straight ahead 0 to 600 ft agl (500 for some models), no pull. For 600 to 2000 agl, pull immediately. Above 2,000 assess the situation. Generally they want you to have 2,000 agl hard deck for a pull if something happens at altitude, but if something happens below 2,000 you still pull.
Now for this accident, you have a scenario where he pulled immediately, which is what we are trained to do for an upset like this, rather than try to recover. I really want to see the data recorder data for this one, hopefully it will tell the story. But I have a different scenario for you. From what I've read it may be that he lost control at 1,000 agl, maybe instead of pulling immediately, where he may have been in a roll, but his airspeed probably would have been around 90 knots, he attempted to recover, couldn't get the aircraft under control, and pulled after losing valuable altitude and at a much higher airspeed? I'm hoping that isn't what happened because it probably means the chute would have worked.
More importantly though, is the question of how he got himself into the vortex of a heavy aircraft, especially while doing pattern work? I fly out of an airport where there is a lot of jet traffic, most of it corporate traffic, although some big corporate jets regularly fly there. There are also large jets, like 757s, large military transports and what not.
So I pretty regularly get a clearance to land, follow the jet, caution wake turbulence. I wouldn't say I'm nonchalent about it, but this accident did shake me a little. What I generally do is fly the visual with 3 or 4 whites and land beyond the 1,000 foot marker if I didn't see where they landed. Sometimes I sink below where I want to be, or land short of the 1,000 foot marker, because, honestly, it just feels wrong. I've resolved after this to be more vigilant on remaining high on my approach, and landing long, both without fail. Anything bigger than a medium corporate jet, I'll tell the controller I want at least a few minutes separation too.