Challenger Jet down in Truckee CA 7/26/21

Very eye opening and scary. There's a lot to be learned from this accident
 
Wow.

The decision to circle to land was taken in an ad hoc manner. No briefing of the procedure, or discussion of a go around. The aircraft was high and fast when the descent was initiated from about 35 miles out, and there was no specific communication about that changing that until the stall and spin occurred.

Flying through the runway centerline and "tightening up" the turn has caused many crashes in lesser aircraft. This professional crew in a jet made the same mistake, and considering the plane was in a 37° bank, rolled over and went in just .8 miles from the threshold, one has to wonder if the FO's not so subtle needling of the CA turned the approach into a "I'll show you how it's done" affair by both pilots. The FO sealed the deal when he deployed the spoilers.
 
Just unbelievable that this type of thing can happen with two "professional" pilots in the cockpit. The poor passengers had no idea what was happening up front and their fate.
 
midwestpa24 said:
Just unbelievable that this type of thing can happen with two "professional" pilots in the cockpit. The poor passengers had no idea what was happening up front and their fate.
Click to expand...
It would be interesting to see the company's hiring and crew pairing history, both in general and with this crew in particular. Also, besides the total time reported by the NTSB their individual flying history would be interesting.
 
3393RP said:
The FO sealed the deal when he deployed the spoilers.
Click to expand...

Yep, if they hadn’t have done that and they’d let the nose drop when they steepened the bank up they would have probably been a-okay. I’ve only flown into Truckee a handful of times, but I have seen lots of interesting “techniques”. It feels mighty claustrophobic in that valley when the weather is crappy.
 
DavidWhite said:
Yep, if they hadn’t have done that and they’d let the nose drop when they steepened the bank up they would have probably been a-okay.
Click to expand...
I'll challenge that statement. If they would've "dropped the nose" then the turn would widen too, defeating the purpose of the steep bank. They should have gone around. Never any need to bank more than 30° when circling.
 
dtuuri said:
I'll challenge that statement. If they would've "dropped the nose" then the turn would widen too, defeating the purpose of the steep bank.
Click to expand...

Thats not how that works.

Here’s a good article about stall speed and bank angles. I agree, never any reason to bank more than 30 however.
 
I will add, that the way both Flightsafety and CAE train circling approaches is an absolute joke. I don’t know what the right way to do it is, but teaching someone all the “tricks” on how to circle into a single airport (usually somewhere very flat) isn’t it. I’ve always thought Truckee would be an excellent place to have people circle, as it’s probably the most likely place they will have to circle anyways. Truckee is the only place I have ever had to do a proper circle to land approach in 7000 hours of flying.
 
DavidWhite said:
I will add, that the way both Flightsafety and CAE train circling approaches is an absolute joke. I don’t know what the right way to do it is, but teaching someone all the “tricks” on how to circle into a single airport (usually somewhere very flat) isn’t it. I’ve always thought Truckee would be an excellent place to have people circle, as it’s probably the most likely place they will have to circle anyways. Truckee is the only place I have ever had to do a proper circle to land approach in 7000 hours of flying.
Click to expand...
Unfortunately annual or semiannual sim training isn’t the place to learn to circle. It’s the place to apply what you know about circling to a specific airplane. There’s also nothing that says you can’t train a circle at Truckee, but since it isn’t an approved circle under Part 60, it doesn’t count as a circle to meet training or checking requirements.

I agree that the “tricks” for the specific airports used are bad. But when someone doesn’t know how to circle, there has to be a way to get them to/through a checkride.
 
Last edited:
DavidWhite said:
Here’s a good article about stall speed and bank angles. I agree, never any reason to bank more than 30 however.
Click to expand...
Nothing there that's contrary to what I'm saying. G-forces result because the flight path is deflected. If the turn radius needed to align with the runway is correct, but you then "unload" the wing by decreasing the g-load you are also increasing the turn radius and won't line up with the runway. No free lunch.
 
dtuuri said:
Nothing there that's contrary to what I'm saying. G-forces result because the flight path is deflected. If the turn radius needed to align with the runway is correct, but you then "unload" the wing by decreasing the g-load you are also increasing the turn radius and won't line up with the runway. No free lunch.
Click to expand...

Overshooting final and stalling the airplane was the last and most simple part of the accident chain. This chain began before the engines started when these two pilots were paired without a clear PIC.
 
DavidWhite said:
I will add, that the way both Flightsafety and CAE train circling approaches is an absolute joke. I don’t know what the right way to do it is, but teaching someone all the “tricks” on how to circle into a single airport (usually somewhere very flat) isn’t it. I’ve always thought Truckee would be an excellent place to have people circle, as it’s probably the most likely place they will have to circle anyways. Truckee is the only place I have ever had to do a proper circle to land approach in 7000 hours of flying.
Click to expand...
MauleSkinner said:
Unfortunately annual or semiannual sim training isn’t the place to learn to circle. It’s the place to apply what you know about circling to a specific airplane. There’s also nothing that says you can’t train a circle at Truckee, but since it isn’t an approved circle under Part 60, it doesn’t count as a circle to meet training or checking requirements.

I agree that the “tricks” for the specific airports used are bad. But when someone doesn’t know how to circle, there has to be a way to get them to/through a checkride.
Click to expand...
And that’s why airlines do not certify pilots for circling approaches.

I know of no airline that types in a jet for circling. (I’m certain someone here will disprove this).

My A320 type is restricted to VFR circle only. I have seen some ATP certificates with no circling regardless of type.
 
farmrjohn said:
It would be interesting to see the company's hiring and crew pairing history, both in general and with this crew in particular. Also, besides the total time reported by the NTSB their individual flying history would be interesting.
Click to expand...

From what I understand, the person in the left seat was employed by the owner of the aircraft and was new to the airplane, the person in the right seat was an experienced contractor with a lot of experience in the airplane.
 
midwestpa24 said:
Overshooting final and stalling the airplane was the last and most simple part of the accident chain.
Click to expand...
Not to mention the FMS default weight was programmed for 3,000 lbs. less weight than actual. That's equivalent to the typical estimated weight of 15 passengers, in practice.
 
midwestpa24 said:
Just unbelievable that this type of thing can happen with two "professional" pilots in the cockpit. The poor passengers had no idea what was happening up front and their fate.
Click to expand...

Crew pairing is one of those areas that some owners, managers, and agencies take too lightly. Combine that with two crew members inability or neglect in functioning effectively, given an extreme imbalance in experience, attitude, or skill set, kills the concept of risk mitigation.

When these two pilots flew this first flight together they should have quickly discovered they needed to be deliberate when playing the parts of PF and PM. The CVR proves there wasn’t a cohesive team working together.

Another thing. SOP. Trying to put two pilots together for their first flight as a crew wasn’t met with any long established SOP that they both could have walked thru to save them. Having training at the big box centers doesn’t solve that problem.
 
TrueCourse said:
Another thing. SOP. Trying to put two pilots together for their first flight as a crew wasn’t met with any long established SOP that they both could have walked thru to save them.
Click to expand...
Not only were they not met with established SOPs, neither appeared to bring any with them.

Two pilots who have and use some form of SOP can work quite well together, even if their SOPs don’t quite match. It just didn’t sound like either one was making any attempt to work as a crew.
 
That’s the risk with “new operator, new pilot, and outside contractor” combination.
 
Kritchlow said:
I know of no airline that types in a jet for circling. (I’m certain someone here will disprove this).
Click to expand...
Challenge accepted!

My 767 type is not restricted. That was done when flying for ATI in 2012. They have since stopped maintaining circling qualifications.
I never did one in the airplane.
 
Ok, I've been perusing the docket this morning and coming to the conclusion the NTSB is kind of giving manufacturers a bit of a pass regarding their operating instructions and how it could have a bearing on the FO's understanding of stall protection:

1) Again, though not Bombardier's fault, the BOW was 3000 lbs. below actual in the FMS, rendering a Vref 6 kts below what it actually should have been — effectively the weight of 15 extra invisible passengers and their effect on stall speed protection. Nothing prompts the database updater to reenter the BOW.​
2) Most pilots would assume, I think, that "Vref" is 1.3 times Vso. However, Bombardier apparently uses 1.23 as a factor, probably for marketing advantages, to fit into more airports. Stall speeds near 100 KIAS, then, result in 7 kts less protection at Vref than many pilots would assume.​
3) The limitation on spoiler deployment is "not below 300 AGL". So, no restriction on using them that I've seen while turning final with flaps extended.​
4) There's a statement in the Flight Crew Operating Manual advising that adding 10 kts to the defined AFM approach speed will give protection from stick shaker activation at bank angles 15° ABOVE the normal 30°, for inadvertent overshoots. So, stall protection is provided at 45° bank angles is how I interpret that.​
5) Although 30° is the specified circling approach flap setting, there is no "defined" approach speed in the AFM for that setting. The only defined approach speed is for flaps 45° and that speed is Vref. No restriction against circling with full 45° flaps.​

So, you can supposedly bank up to 45° as long as you add 10 KIAS for maneuvering, and you stow the spoilers before 300 AGL. According to Bombardier.
EDIT: BUT the plane stalled at 37° of bank at Vref + 12 KIAS above 300 AGL. According to NTSB. So much for believing everything you read in the AFM, FMS and training manuals.
 
Last edited:
We are allowed to circle with minimums of 1000 and 3nm or published whichever is higher.
 
dtuuri said:
: BUT the plane stalled at 37° of bank at Vref + 12 KIAS above 300 AGL. According to NTSB. So much for believing everything you read in the AFM, FMS and training manuals.
Click to expand...

I cant remember if the NTSB mentions anything about about g-load during this turn, but an accelerated stall would not follow with the published stall speed. Throw in the spoilers and you’re finished.
 
Excluding visual circles at TEB, which are barely a circle maneuver, the real circle approaches I’ve done when there is weather or darkness are burned into my memory.
 
TrueCourse said:
Excluding visual circles at TEB, which are barely a circle maneuver, the real circle approaches I’ve done when there is weather or darkness are burned into my memory.
Click to expand...
With probably a couple hundred “real” circles in jets, my 7 missed approaches (not from circles) were more traumatic.
 
dtuuri said:
Ok, I've been perusing the docket this morning and coming to the conclusion the NTSB is kind of giving manufacturers a bit of a pass regarding their operating instructions and how it could have a bearing on the FO's understanding of stall protection:

1) Again, though not Bombardier's fault, the BOW was 3000 lbs. below actual in the FMS, rendering a Vref 6 kts below what it actually should have been — effectively the weight of 15 extra invisible passengers and their effect on stall speed protection. Nothing prompts the database updater to reenter the BOW.​
2) Most pilots would assume, I think, that "Vref" is 1.3 times Vso. However, Bombardier apparently uses 1.23 as a factor, probably for marketing advantages, to fit into more airports. Stall speeds near 100 KIAS, then, result in 7 kts less protection at Vref than many pilots would assume.​
3) The limitation on spoiler deployment is "not below 300 AGL". So, no restriction on using them that I've seen while turning final with flaps extended.​
4) There's a statement in the Flight Crew Operating Manual advising that adding 10 kts to the defined AFM approach speed will give protection from stick shaker activation at bank angles 15° ABOVE the normal 30°, for inadvertent overshoots. So, stall protection is provided at 45° bank angles is how I interpret that.​
5) Although 30° is the specified circling approach flap setting, there is no "defined" approach speed in the AFM for that setting. The only defined approach speed is for flaps 45° and that speed is Vref. No restriction against circling with full 45° flaps.​

So, you can supposedly bank up to 45° as long as you add 10 KIAS for maneuvering, and you stow the spoilers before 300 AGL. According to Bombardier.
EDIT: BUT the plane stalled at 37° of bank at Vref + 12 KIAS above 300 AGL. According to NTSB. So much for believing everything you read in the AFM, FMS and training manuals.
Click to expand...
But the flight crew never did stow the spoilers. From FDR data, spoilers were deployed around 500 ft AGL and remained deployed. The aircraft departed controlled flight at 174 ft AGL. The NTSB noted that the stick shaker/stick pusher operated per spec, accommodating the increased stall speed with spoiler deployment. The stick pusher properly reduced AOA by commanding 10 deg TED elevator. Then one or both pilots rescued defeat from the jaws of victory by promptly applying 18 deg TEU elevator. No recovery was possible beyond that point. One bite at the apple, dentures left at home in the jar.

Had the spoilers not been a factor (not used or properly stowed), the NTSB likely would have placed more emphasis on the erroneous Vref data due to BOW error. NTSB sidestepped establishing who was responsible for reentering the actual BOW data after the FMC maintenance. The director of maintenance would seem to be a good candidate.
 
AquaLand said:
But the flight crew never did stow the spoilers. From FDR data, spoilers were deployed around 500 ft AGL and remained deployed. The aircraft departed controlled flight at 174 ft AGL.
Click to expand...
Take a look at Fig 10b. I think the stick shaker went off above 300 AGL so technically they were compliant with limitations at that point:
All other factors the same, they'd probably have departed controlled flight and not survived even at pattern altitude or even higher, IMO.
 
TrueCourse said:
I cant remember if the NTSB mentions anything about about g-load during this turn, but an accelerated stall would not follow with the published stall speed. Throw in the spoilers and you’re finished.
Click to expand...
Take a look at Fig 24. It would be nice if this chart was available to the operator before the accident investigation. IDK, maybe it was?

It would be interesting to see it overlaid on a similar chart for the erroneous weight from the FMS to compare how the FO might have been expecting stall margins.
 
AquaLand said:
Then one or both pilots rescued defeat from the jaws of victory by promptly applying 18 deg TEU elevator.
Click to expand...
I never flew a Challenger, but have a lot of early Lear time. The pusher force in those, IIRC, was 80 lbs. It would be natural to fight it and then when it suddenly releases, you can imagine what will happen to the elevator. We used to turn off the stall warning switches on short final in gusty wind to prevent inadvertent pusher actuation.
 
AquaLand said:
…the NTSB likely would have placed more emphasis on the erroneous Vref data due to BOW error. NTSB sidestepped establishing who was responsible for reentering the actual BOW data after the FMC maintenance. The director of maintenance would seem to be a good candidate.
Click to expand...
Presumably the proper BOW would have been used for planning purposes, and the discrepancy noted when they programmed the FMS…it keeps going back to an unprofessional flight crew.
 
MauleSkinner said:
Presumably the proper BOW would have been used for planning purposes, and the discrepancy noted when they programmed the FMS…it keeps going back to an unprofessional flight crew.
Click to expand...
The crewmembers both used Foreflight for planning purposes and each had what I'd say were a big difference in planned landing weight. The "captain" was the closest to the weight the NTSB calculated. I'm putting captain in quotes, since he seems to have been a trainee receiving initial operating experience (IOE). Also, there were four prior flights by this operator since purchase of this airplane some 3 months earlier. Nobody else noticed the discrepancy? Beware of operations with more ambition than ability to conduct oversight. Boeing, lately?
 
dtuuri said:
The crewmembers both used Foreflight for planning purposes and each had what I'd say were a big difference in planned landing weight. The "captain" was the closest to the weight the NTSB calculated. I'm putting captain in quotes, since he seems to have been a trainee receiving initial operating experience (IOE). Also, there were four prior flights by this operator since purchase of this airplane some 3 months earlier. Nobody else noticed the discrepancy? Beware of operators with more ambition than ability to conduct oversight. Boeing, lately?
Click to expand...
True… but as pilots, we can’t control the operator, we need to ensure things are done correctly on our end.

Operators with more ambition than ability tend to hire pilots with a matching lack of ability.
 
MauleSkinner said:
True… but as pilots, we can’t control the operator, we need to ensure things are done correctly on our end.
Click to expand...
Still, they were far enough above the erroneous Vref provided by the FMS that they were within published limits. Apparently, there's no requirement for the FMS to adjust Vref when spoilers are deployed. In fact, pilots are practically invited to temporarily "overshoot" the normal 30° bank angle by simply adding 10 KIAS to the unadjusted Vref.

EDIT: View Item #20, bottom page #2 in the docket.

NTSB Docket - Docket Management System

data.ntsb.gov data.ntsb.gov
 
Last edited:
I've noticed that many people, here and on other sites and in various analysis videos, etc., make a big deal of the Captain only having 230 hours in the 605, and that this is likely to be an important factor in the accident. But it seems that most people miss that he had 2300 PIC hours in the CL-601 as well, and 500 PIC in the Gulfstream 200. Added to that, significant SIC time in several other jets, mostly in the 737 (1300). So this pilot may have been "relatively" new to the 605, but not to jets in general, and not to operating at jet speeds.

It's not like the 605 was his first jet after flying Cherokees.

Yes, the 601 and 605 are slightly different, but they're not that different in terms of speeds, turn radius, bank angle, handling, etc., all of the things that go into flying a circling approach. I just don't see the 605 experience as being as big of a factor as some make it out to be. Meaning, I think this accident would likely have happened regardless of the airplane involved.

This accident is very pertinent to my organization, since we operate both the 601 and the 605, and often have crew pairings similar to the accident flight, where the PIC has less experience in the model than the SIC, and/or the SIC has much more total time than the PIC. It's pretty common in the contract world as well.
 
RussR said:
I've noticed that many people, here and on other sites and in various analysis videos, etc., make a big deal of the Captain only having 230 hours in the 605, and that this is likely to be an important factor in the accident. But it seems that most people miss that he had 2300 PIC hours in the CL-601 as well, and 500 PIC in the Gulfstream 200. Added to that, significant SIC time in several other jets, mostly in the 737 (1300). So this pilot may have been "relatively" new to the 605, but not to jets in general, and not to operating at jet speeds.

It's not like the 605 was his first jet after flying Cherokees.

Yes, the 601 and 605 are slightly different, but they're not that different in terms of speeds, turn radius, bank angle, handling, etc., all of the things that go into flying a circling approach. I just don't see the 605 experience as being as big of a factor as some make it out to be. Meaning, I think this accident would likely have happened regardless of the airplane involved.

This accident is very pertinent to my organization, since we operate both the 601 and the 605, and often have crew pairings similar to the accident flight, where the PIC has less experience in the model than the SIC, and/or the SIC has much more total time than the PIC. It's pretty common in the contract world as well.
Click to expand...
This accident is an example of needing to establish, and adhere to strict SOP’s. Generally speaking charter outfits lack that in the first place, and bringing in a contract pilot makes it near impossible.
This is a prime example.

There can only be one captain, but he must be the captain.
In this accident, it seems like the FO was overstepping his bounds, but the captain was not assertive.
Neither was acting in the role they should have been.
 
When this tragedy occurred, I was just resuming flying after a 12 year haitus. Now, I'm finally taking instrument ground school-and we covered approaches, including circle to land, last week. This thread, and the input from the posters here, is very helpful to me, as one who has done a total of three instrument approaches (ha!- at least they were all in actual instrument conditions-love the NoCal marine layer for that)

If this accident doesn't have something to teach almost any pilot, you're better at flying than Doolittle, Yeager, and Lindberg, combined ;)
 
I mean, by the read of the CVR exchange, the CA in name only was terminally behind the airplane. Yes, the CRM situation was a hot mess, but that CA asserting himself wasn't going to fix the fact he was behind, and I mean "who issued that guy a PIC type rating on this thing" level of behind. The loss of control out of that circle was frankly baked into that one.

Again, hot mess CRM notwithstanding, I'm willing to bet had the FO flown the whole thing from the jump they would have been alive. He wasn't an effective instructor, and I'm willing to give a pass in that I don't think that should have been his role in the first place. Again this seemed like another case of ad hoc OJT, and per usual the bystander paying passengers pay the price for the imprudence of those up front biting off more than they can chew.

Good bad or indifferent, this is further fodder to support the safety record of 121. The eye-gougingly boring levels of standardization and pool-noodle-lined terminal/landing operations does have an aggregate net safety effect, even in the presence of non-insignificant levels of handflown instrument cross check atrophy within the ranks by automation overreliance proxy. Op Standards aren't a catch-all, but they work pretty good; hard to deny it [121 safety outcomes] in the face of these accidents.

In the macro and unrelated, I just hope they don't outlaw single pilot flying before I hang it up.
 
hindsight2020 said:
I mean, by the read of the CVR exchange, the CA in name only was terminally behind the airplane. Yes, the CRM situation was a hot mess, but that CA asserting himself wasn't going to fix the fact he was behind, and I mean "who issued that guy a PIC type rating on this thing" level of behind. The loss of control out of that circle was frankly baked into that one.

Again, hot mess CRM notwithstanding, I'm willing to bet had the FO flown the whole thing from the jump they would have been alive. He wasn't an effective instructor, and I'm willing to give a pass in that I don't think that should have been his role in the first place. Again this seemed like another case of ad hoc OJT, and per usual the bystander paying passengers pay the price for the imprudence of those up front biting off more than they can chew.

Good bad or indifferent, this is further fodder to support the safety record of 121. The eye-gougingly boring levels of standardization and pool-noodle-lined terminal/landing operations does have an aggregate net safety effect, even in the presence of non-insignificant levels of handflown instrument cross check atrophy within the ranks by automation overreliance proxy. Op Standards aren't a catch-all, but they work pretty good; hard to deny it [121 safety outcomes] in the face of these accidents.

In the macro and unrelated, I just hope they don't outlaw single pilot flying before I hang it up.
Click to expand...
If proper CRM, and SOP’s were in place, the entire cockpit communications, and hopefully actions, would have been different.
The PM would NEVER have extended the brakes, and certainly not without announcing it.

I don’t expect most here to understand how SOP’s work.
Heck, in the charter world…??? No.
Corporate world??? Maybe.
Airline world?? To a tee.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.
Back
Top