Beechcraft Baron 55 down in Leyden MA, triple fatal

This Vmc simulator for a generic light twin, by creator and narrator Prof. (Emeritus) Les Kumpula, of Embry-Riddle, shows how to stay alive in a twin. It should open near the end for those who only are interested in the "how" not the "why". My personal advice is to keep the nose and wings near the horizon and the airflow coming from the dead engine, not the good one (watch the green arrow ahead of the nose). When you begin to slip toward the good engine, you're heading down a slippery slope toward a BIG cross-control stall. If you don't bank the allowable 5°, say half that much, Vmc is higher, so you can begin your recovery farther from the stall, i.e., a safer airspeed. I bet the DPE won't notice (nor care) if you say "There's five degrees of bank," even if it isn't. :)

EDIT: And I should have said keep the control yoke near level and the nose squarely on a point, too!

 
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I wondered based on flight path if this was a power off stall, where on recovery, one engine stumbled while the other made full power. Seems like that is a recipe for spin entry? Most multi training flights don’t go direct to Vmc demo after steep turns. Usually a power off and maybe power on stall demo first to get a feel for how the plane handles. This is actually a fear of mine, that I will need to do a go around after a bounced landing or something, and be in a nose high trim with only one engine responding. Of course nobody says you need full power initially to arrest descent in a twin, you have time to ease in the power evenly.
 
*grenade pin chime*

Frankly, I find piston ME training the biggest heap of negative transfer out there, given the majority applicant demographic in question. I did my ATP ride in the semenhole, and immediately brain dumped that whole stop-oriented affair of underpowered twins. If I was a recreational twin lawnmower driver, sure all that is well and good. But for what most revenue piston twin training is being directed to, they could do the entire thing ab initio in turbine sims and it wouldn't negatively affect safety outcomes one iota. This stuff is tolerated because it is cheaper than the level C+ sims, which is crazy to me.
 
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I remember reading some stuff from one flight school about how it was a really safe and fine thing to do, not a big deal. And then they had this happen:


Tailwheels Etc in Florida. I don't think they're a flight school anymore.

I don't fly a twin and have never been through this. From my outside perspective, it seems a bit more dangerous in some aircraft than spin training, and maybe less useful. I say that because you're only supposed to do spin training in an aircraft rated for it, and at an altitude where recovery is possible. But Vmc demo seems a little bit like spin avoidance training, if there were such a thing, in an aircraft that isn't necessarily rated for spins.
 
I remember reading some stuff from one flight school about how it was a really safe and fine thing to do, not a big deal. And then they had this happen:

Did you read the report? Very interesting if you key on certain facts. Doesn't look like a pilot induced problem to me:

"A witness heard a “pop” sound, and another witness heard an unusual engine sound; ... the airplane began to slow about that time, ... The airplane then began a right turn, pitched nose down, descended into a building, and was nearly consumed by a postcrash fire.​
...​
No structure associated with the aft portion of the fuselage was identified in the wreckage.​
...​
The rudder with attached trim tab and a flight bag separated from the airplane during the descent came to rest outside the impact area. The separated rudder exhibited evidence of overtravel in both directions that is consistent with loss of cable tension; the reason for the loss of cable tension could not be determined. It also could not be determined how the flight bag became separated from the wreckage."​

Sounds like flutter after the cable broke.
 
Did you read the report? Very interesting if you key on certain facts. Doesn't look like a pilot induced problem to me:

"A witness heard a “pop” sound, and another witness heard an unusual engine sound; ... the airplane began to slow about that time, ... The airplane then began a right turn, pitched nose down, descended into a building, and was nearly consumed by a postcrash fire.​
...​
No structure associated with the aft portion of the fuselage was identified in the wreckage.​
...​
The rudder with attached trim tab and a flight bag separated from the airplane during the descent came to rest outside the impact area. The separated rudder exhibited evidence of overtravel in both directions that is consistent with loss of cable tension; the reason for the loss of cable tension could not be determined. It also could not be determined how the flight bag became separated from the wreckage."​

Sounds like flutter after the cable broke.
I did. The summary being "Probable Cause: An in-flight loss of control for reasons that could not be determined during postaccident investigation; the loss of control likely occurred during a simulated loss of power in the right engine during an instructional flight. "

It reads as an example of a Vmc demo flight resulting in an accident to me. Maybe the accident wasn't the result of pilot error, and was rather cable system failure? That could be, but it doesn't make Vmc demo flights seem safer, or at least not safer in an Apache.
 
Reads to me like the failure of the non-critical engine could not be controlled for lack of rudder authority due to the inadequate cable tension and then perhaps subsequent rudder flutter.
 
The NTSB doesn’t always commit to a probable (or clear) cause even though the guts of the report provide evidence implying what the cause might be. It would be nice if they had a “our uncommitted opinion is” section too.
 
All other flight schools and instructors in the area cancelled all of their flights that day due to hazardous weather, realizing it wasn't a good day to make money. Here are details from the NTSB Preliminary Report:

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The tail section was partially separated from the empennage but remained attached via control cables.The fuselage was compressed and crushed downward. Airframe icing was observed on the leading edge of both wings and horizontal stabilizers, both engine nacelles, and the leading edge of the rudder. Ice was also observed on the front face of one of the left engine’s propeller blades, and on the nav antenna located on the vertical stabilizer.

Weather reported at Orange Municipal Airport (ORE), Orange, Massachusetts, about 12 miles east of the accident site, at 1152, was reported as wind from 220 degrees at 11 knots gusting to 23 knots, visibility 10 miles, broken clouds at 4,600 ft, a temperature of 2 degrees C, a dewpoint of -7 C, and a barometric pressure setting of 29.68.

At the time of the accident, two AIRMETs (Airman Meteorological Information) were issued and active, including AIRMET Zulu for moderate icing conditions. There was also a SIGMET (Significant Meteorological Information) for occasional severe turbulence between 3,000 and 16,000 ft (msl) due to strong low-level winds.
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I see this as similar to taking spin training out of the syllabus. You teach people to not stall and avoid spins.

Why not with multiengine training do the training and emphasis to NOT get below blue line speed?

When I did my multi piston checkout (AMEL rating from military), what I recall the most is how low the nose is for blue line. There is a STRONG compulsion to raise the nose to climb.

Maybe train to that concept.

FYI, I am NOT saying I totally agree with today's way of training stalls and slow flight/MCA.
 
I see this as similar to taking spin training out of the syllabus. You teach people to not stall and avoid spins.

Why not with multiengine training do the training and emphasis to NOT get below blue line speed?

When I did my multi piston checkout (AMEL rating from military), what I recall the most is how low the nose is for blue line. There is a STRONG compulsion to raise the nose to climb.

Maybe train to that concept.

FYI, I am NOT saying I totally agree with today's way of training stalls and slow flight/MCA.
The suggestion was made on another board to use a shock collar, and zap the student if he gets below blue line. I think that would be more effective than a Vmc demo.
 
The suggestion was made on another board to use a shock collar, and zap the student if he gets below blue line. I think that would be more effective than a Vmc demo.
Or use 2.5° of bank doing the demo, instead of 5°.
 
Fwiw, the only other airplane in the sky that day was another plane from this school.
Thank you for mentioning that. Very irresponsible of that flight school, FlyLugu
 
Blancolirio analysis here:
So what I take away from this is ........don't bring passengers in the back seat for VMC demo flights. Perhaps one could do careful CG calculations and perhaps put ballast in the nose baggage area to have as far forward legal CG as possible.

Then there is the altitude thing. One doesn't want to experience a true VMC demo at higher altitudes because one reaches the stall speed first with a lot of yaw. That leaves a true VMC demo only at lower altitudes but one doesn't want to do this at lower altitudes. But one doesn't want to do VMC demos at low altitudes. As a result, one goes to the higher altitude and creates a 'fake' VMC speed that is higher than the real VMC speed. In the fake VMC speed scenario, one runs out of rudder earlier and at a lower rudder and rudder pedal deflection by having the flight instructor place his foot appropriately to block further movement of the rudder pedals at a partial deflection point. It ends up being at whatever point the instructor happens to place his foot. Perhaps the student is advised of this so they know that they will reach some sort of resistance(the instructors foot) so they don't misunderstand the reason for the rudder pedal being unable to deflect as far during the exercise and when the control check was done on the ground. Loss of directional control is experienced at a higher airspeed(due to lack of yaw capability) than if there was no rudder blockage and at a speed hopefully greater than the stall speed.

Is this correct?
 
In the fake VMC speed scenario, one runs out of rudder earlier and at a lower rudder and rudder pedal deflection by having the flight instructor place his foot appropriately to block further movement of the rudder pedals at a partial deflection point. It ends up being at whatever point the instructor happens to place his foot. Perhaps the student is advised of this so they know that they will reach some sort of resistance(the instructors foot) so they don't misunderstand the reason for the rudder pedal being unable to deflect as far during the exercise and when the control check was done on the ground. Loss of directional control is experienced at a higher airspeed(due to lack of yaw capability) than if there was no rudder blockage and at a speed hopefully greater than the stall speed.

Is this correct?
It's the correct description of what some folks do as well as why they shouldn't: A lot of inconsistency and negative transfer going on. A big hairy leg pushing back at your attempt to locate the "iron stop" on the rudder isn't a solid feeling, so would result in confusion and delay before applying corrective action, thereby nullifying the strategy. That's why I say simply don't bank as much as the manufacturer did during certification. At half the 5° value, VMC is going to be higher, resulting in a safer demonstration. Of course, you can't be sloppily holding a heading! You must have it nailed throughout the demonstration and recover the instant it starts to wander. If you're trying to "steer" a heading with aileron, your bank will get too steep and you might die.
 
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