Baggage Handler Killed in Montgomery (Jet Engine)

[jesse]

I won’t do a walk around for a running airplane but I can guarantee you that I’ll be sitting in the cockpit of a running airplane waiting for the ground ops guys to hook up ground power before the captain shuts down the engines.

If someone on that ground crew blows off SOP and approaches the aircraft while it’s still running there is a chance they will die like the one in Montgomery.

I don’t see how that connects to saltys thread. Unless you’re just now realizing there is undeniable evidence that getting ingested into an operating jet engine is potentially lethal. Not sure that was ever in question.

The scenarios are completely different.

A significant difference is there is no operational way to remove the running engine from the Montgomery accident. It’s easily removed from the one salty shared.

but whatever. Nice to have your input

Clearly something must be done! I suggest we require all ground crew within 1,000 engines of a jet engine be physically tethered to one or more ground points at all times. It would be so much fun watching people clip & unclip themselves as they walk around.

We should probably tether airplanes as they taxi too. Otherwise it's only a matter of time before a 787 engine ingests an entire RJ!

 

[Albany Tom]

I don't see much similarity between this one and Salty's experience. I'm 100% supportive of Salty, and it's because the people around that aircraft were just bystanders.

It sucks when someone is hurt by an aircraft, but this was an accident involving people that were trained to work around aircraft, and had an awareness of the risks. To me, it's similar to a machinist getting hurt while running a lathe, if any machinists still used manual lathes. There's going to be an investigation, and procedures and training will likely change.

Question though - for this kind of ground accident, is it NTSB or FAA or OSHA that investigates? Asking because I've had customers who were in the mining industry, and for the mining parts OSHA did not do the safety work, it was MSHA and they had different people, different standards, etc. Tougher, actually, and for good reason.

 

[Capngrog]

My guess, since this incident resulted in a fatality and substantial damage (engine tear down at the very least?) to an aircraft, the NTSB will take the lead on this one; however, the FAA and OSHA probably will be "parties to the investigation" and will issue their own reports.

 

[Roger Wilco]

Here's an excerpt of my earlier post:

...a connection between this...accident and the concerns that the OP of that thread expressed...

The line of inquiry I attempted to initiate was intended to use the Piedmont accident as an example of the serious potential danger that a running aircraft engine--any running aircraft engine--poses to humans in the immediate vicinity, and point out that the operation Salty observed featured both an aircraft with a running engine and humans in the immediate vicinity. I was in no way suggesting that the circumstances were identical.

Too many people have been hideously hacked to death by propellers, rotors, and jet engine compressors/fans. Many more have been grievously injured, and a smaller number have been air-fried and rolled-up into a ball by jet blast. As some have pointed-out, the Piedmont accident involved an individual who (presumably) had received training and was given procedures created to prevent such a tragedy. In Salty's thread, it was likewise pointed-out that there were individuals in near proximity to the airplane who likely had no such training, and who may not have any experience with airplanes at all. A number of folks in Salty's thread downplayed the hazard that he identified and some expressed disapproval (to be polite) of his actions. While I might have dealt with that situation differently, I definitely agree that the operation Salty described constituted a potentially lethal hazard and that measures to mitigate that hazard were, shall we say, lacking.

The connection between the Piedmont accident and the ride operation Salty observed is twofold: 1). Even with trained personnel involved, a momentary lapse of SA or simple human error can be tragic; and 2). Given the risks involved, extraordinary care must be taken by all involved--especially those directly responsible for the operation.

It seems probable that Piedmont's training, procedures, and supervision will come under intense scrutiny in an effort to identify and eliminate causal and contributory factors. As for the Yak operation, however...well, Salty might have overreacted. Or, he might have saved someone's life.

Ultimately, if the purpose of discussing accidents and mishaps is to learn from them and to avoid making the same or similar mistakes, what can we learn from these two threads, that we can apply to our own operations?

RW

 

[Capngrog]

What I've learned over the years, is that some of the most dangerous conditions encountered on an active aircraft ramp involve perils that are essentially invisible. By that, I mean moving propeller/rotor blades are nearly invisible as is the low pressure inlet and high pressure exhaust of a jet engine. Ramp personnel are trained to exercise extreme caution around operating aircraft engines, and even these trained personnel can put themselves in grave danger just by a moment's inattention, or a feeling of complacency. Unsupervised, untrained folks on an active aircraft ramp are an accident waiting to happen. Frequent re-training of personnel and close supervision of "visitors" is necessary. The re-training need not be elaborate or formal, but can consist of simple "tool box" meetings prior to beginning a work shift. Now matter what we do, the accident rate can never be reduced to zero ... even OSHA acknowledges that fact.

Just my opinion.

 

[Roger Wilco]

What I've learned over the years, is that some of the most dangerous conditions encountered on an active aircraft ramp involve perils that are essentially invisible.

Well put, and more fact than opinion I'd say.

My first aviation job was working as a line boy at a small GA-only airport. That experience included a couple of instances in which I could easily have made a statistic of myself. One such near-miss was witnessed by the local IA. A classic man-of-few-words, he seldom spoke except as necessary in the course of his work. But that day, he really let me have it with both barrels blazing--and I am forever grateful.

After I began instructing, I made it a policy to give every student I flew with an "airport safety orientation" prior to our first flight together. We discussed the inherent hazards of the airport ramp and hangar areas, and I stressed the fact that many of those dangers are, as you astutely observe, invisible. It's a bit of a high wire act, as an instructor, to instill an understanding of, and respect for, the potential perils of flying without creating fear and apprehension. Avoiding buzzkill, while avoiding a buzz kill, so to speak. I just hope that those pilots found something in those discussions worth taking with them.

RW

 

[unsafervguy]

Rumor is the OP aircraft had MEL'd APU and kept one engine running at gate till GPU plugged in. Perhaps handler heard one engine shutdown but didn't realize the other was still running? Regardless somewhere the system failed.

I had dinner last week with someone very close to the investigation, that’s as much about who that I will say, but, yes the apu was inop, the aircraft was stopped, and the left engine was shut down. The victim approached from the left side of the aircraft. The only procedure that would require an approach from the left is to connect ground a/c, which by procedure is not to be done until engines are shut down and beacons off. This tragedy was 100 percent preventable if sop’s had been followed. As to another post, yes osha is very involved in the investigation, and not just as a interested party.

 

[weilke]

There are 10 million annual scheduled airline flights. This particular accident doesn't happen every year. So if we wanted to look at a system that avoids this from happening with a 50 millon to 1 chance, whatever we have right now would be the system you want to implement.

 

[Plano Pilot]

Report is out. DCA23LA109

On December 31, 2022, about 1539 eastern standard time (EST), an Embraer 170 airplane, N264NN, was involved in an accident while parked at the gate with one engine running at Montgomery Regional Airport (MGM), Montgomery, Alabama. The 63 passengers and crew onboard were uninjured. One ramp personnel was fatally injured. The flight was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulation Part 121as a regularly scheduled domestic passenger flight from Dallas Fort Worth (DFW), Texas to MGM. The flight was operated by Envoy Air Inc. doing business as American Eagle flight ENY3408 with an inoperative auxiliary power unit (APU). The flight crew reported that after an uneventful flight they elected to leave both engines running for the required two-minute engine cool down period. As the airplane approached the gate, three ramp agents were present, but clear of the safety area. After stopping the aircraft and setting the parking brake, the captain gave the hand signal to connect the airplane to ground power. As he was shutting down the number 2 (right) engine the “DOOR CRG FWD OPEN” engine indicating and crew alerting system (EICAS) message appeared (indicating that the forward cargo door had opened). The first officer (FO) opened his cockpit window to inform the ramp agent that the engines were still operating. The captain then made a brief announcement asking the passengers to remain seated until the seat belt sign had been turned off. He then relayed his intentions to the FO that the seat belt sign would stay illuminated until they had connected to ground power and could shut down the number 1 (left) engine. Immediately thereafter, he saw a warning light illuminate and the airplane shook violently followed by the immediate automatic shutdown of the number 1 engine. Unsure of what had occurred, he extinguished the emergency lights and shut off both batteries before leaving the flight deck to investigate. Video surveillance captured the accident sequence and showed the airplane being marshalled to the gate. After the nose wheel was chocked, the ramp agent marshaling the airplane walked toward the forward cargo door located on the right side and near the front of the airplane. Page 2 of 4 DCA23LA109 This information is preliminary and subject to change. Simultaneously, another ramp agent appeared walking towards the back of the airplane with an orange safety cone where she disappeared from view. A third ramp agent located near the right wing tip could be seen gesturing with his hand towards the back of the airplane. Meanwhile, a fourth ramp agent knelt near the airplane’s nose wheel. The ramp agent from the back of the airplane reappeared and began walking away from the airplane and towards the left wing tip where she disappeared from the camera’s field of view. The marshaller could be seen backing away from the airplane’s open forward cargo door and the ramp agent from the back of the airplane reappeared walking along the leading edge of the left wing and directly in front of the number one engine. She was subsequently pulled off her feet and into the operating engine. Throughout the course of the accident, the airplane’s upper rotating beacon light appeared to be illuminated. The ground crew reported that a safety briefing was held about 10 minutes before the airplane arrived at the gate. A second safety “huddle” was held shortly before the airplane arrived at the gate, to reiterate that the engines would remain running until ground power was connected. It was also discussed that the airplane should not be approached, and the diamond of safety cones should not be set until the engines were off, spooled down, and the airplane’s rotating beacon light had been extinguished by the flight crew. One ramp agent located near the right wing tip stated that he observed another ramp agent approach the back of the airplane to set the rear safety cone. He observed her almost fall over from the engines exhaust while he attempted to alert her to stay back and wait for the engines to be shut down. He also stated that he observed the airplane’s upper and lower rotating beacon lights illuminated. Another ramp agent stated that after chocking the nose wheel of the airplane, he observed another ramp agent approach the forward cargo door and he knelt to wave him off. He then observed another ramp agent about to set the safety cone at the rear of the airplane, he yelled and waved her off as the number 1 engine was still running. He observed her as she began to move away from the airplane before he turned to lower the cord for the ground power. Shortly thereafter he heard a “bang” and the engine shut down. The American Eagle Ground Operations Manual, Revision 3 dated July 13, 2022, states in part: To Keep Employees Alive and Aircraft Intact, You Will: NEVER approach an aircraft to position ground equipment next to an aircraft or open cargo bin doors until the engines are shut down and the rotating beacon(s) turned off, except when conducting an approved single engine turn.

 

[Bell206]

More readable copy:
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/106517/pdf

 

[Dry Creek]

What a tragedy. I feel really bad for the employee's family, the flight crew, but most of all any of the passengers with window seats aft of that engine.

 

[midwestpa24]

So it sounds like it was briefed, but then two or more different ground crew members failed to follow what was briefed and approached the aircraft while it was still running. I wonder if it was a matter of one crew member going about the normal routine, that then triggered the rest to think they should as well? Terrible yet fully avoidable tragedy.

 

[ElPaso Pilot]

What a tragedy. I feel really bad for the employee's family, the flight crew, but most of all any of the passengers with window seats aft of that engine.

Inadvertently found the ELP pics while googling for an article on that incident.

Big regret, and yes, you are correct.

 

[midwestpa24]

Inadvertently found the ELP pics while googling for an article on that incident.

Big regret, and yes, you are correct.

It may be very morbid, but maybe there is value in showing such photos in training to make sure employees understand the gravity of these mistakes.

When I was in our high school ag program, they did something similar to highlight the dangers of working in and around ag equipment. I believe it was a slideshow sponsored by an Ag insurance company, but it showed actual photos of people who had been grievously injured by PTOs, bush hogs, tractor rollovers, etc. It wasn't so much about being some type of sick snuff show, it was to impress upon us the true hazards we may encounter and the WHY of what we were being taught.