Alaska Airlines explosive decompression 1/5/23

See Juan Browne's update on this.
He links to a video on utoob "The Boeing 737 Technical Channel" which provides a very detailed description of the plug door installation there.
Excellent video, explains how the door is installed and secured.
 
Not claiming those pictures are real or accurate. Haven’t vetted the source at all (not that I really could). Just found it online while surfing and figured I’d share.

And I don’t know if my pics are the actual plug either. Someone on one of my FB places said they are.
 
Interesting (possible) ramification:

Last week’s accident involving a Boeing Co. 737 Max 9 not only resulted in the grounding of scores of jets, but could complicate a deferred prosecution agreement that Boeing struck with the Justice Department in 2021 that was set to expire over the weekend.
That deal resolved a probe into Boeing following the crashes of Lion Air Flight 610 in October 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 in March of 2019, which together killed 346 passengers and crew. The agreement allowed the DOJ to dismiss a criminal charge against Boeing if the company demonstrated that it had beefed up its compliance programs.
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Almost all corporate deferred prosecution cases result in charges being dismissed. But if the Justice Department determines that Boeing hasn’t met the terms of the deal, it could extend the agreement for one or more years. And in the unlikely case that prosecutors ultimately determine that Boeing breached the agreement, they can tear it up and charge the company with the conduct that it admitted to as part of the deal.
Under the terms of the DPA, dated Jan. 6, 2021, the Justice Department now has six months to determine whether Boeing has complied with the compliance obligations imposed by prosecutors.
 
Interesting (possible) ramification:

Last week’s accident involving a Boeing Co. 737 Max 9 not only resulted in the grounding of scores of jets, but could complicate a deferred prosecution agreement that Boeing struck with the Justice Department in 2021 that was set to expire over the weekend.
That deal resolved a probe into Boeing following the crashes of Lion Air Flight 610 in October 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 in March of 2019, which together killed 346 passengers and crew. The agreement allowed the DOJ to dismiss a criminal charge against Boeing if the company demonstrated that it had beefed up its compliance programs.
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Almost all corporate deferred prosecution cases result in charges being dismissed. But if the Justice Department determines that Boeing hasn’t met the terms of the deal, it could extend the agreement for one or more years. And in the unlikely case that prosecutors ultimately determine that Boeing breached the agreement, they can tear it up and charge the company with the conduct that it admitted to as part of the deal.
Under the terms of the DPA, dated Jan. 6, 2021, the Justice Department now has six months to determine whether Boeing has complied with the compliance obligations imposed by prosecutors.
 
I don’t think this works out great for Boeing.

I dunno; they skated through the MAX crashes and survived, and nobody died in this incident. But it's more confirmation of the culture problem at Boeing which I've mentioned several times before. I don't think it's going to change.
 
Sounds like the maintenance folks chased the altitude pressurization control unit for issues rather than asking what was causing it to report an error in the first place.
 
I dunno; they skated through the MAX crashes and survived, and nobody died in this incident. But it's more confirmation of the culture problem at Boeing which I've mentioned several times before. I don't think it's going to change.
Yeah. It’s a **** company. Lots around that are still in business. Im sure they will survive.
 
Other Spirit quality issues reported, while simultaneously being pushed by Boeing to increase production rate.




Boeing Commercial Airplanes lost $678 million in the third quarter, and the company now says it will not hit its previous target of delivering 400-450 737s in 2023. It cites a problem involving defective aft-pressure bulkheads supplied by Wichita-based Spirit.

Boeing now expects to close 2023 with 375-400 737 deliveries for the year.
The pressure-bulkhead problem has forced Boeing to complete the tedious work of inspecting hundreds of drill holes in the bulkheads of many of its stored 737 Max. Boeing chief financial officer Brian West says some 75% of Boeing’s roughly 250 stored 737 need inspections.
We’re moving through rework on the most recent non-conformance in the aft-pressure bulkhead. That work slowed production and deliveries down in the course of the quarter,” says Calhoun.


Slowdown aside, Calhoun says Boeing is pushing to bring the 737 production system to a rate of 38 jets monthly before year-end, and to 50 monthly by 2025 or 2026. Boeing this year stabilised the rate at 31 jets monthly.
We are keeping our suppliers hot, according to the master schedule,”
 
Yeah. It’s a **** company. Lots around that are still in business. Im sure they will survive.

Probably so; the challenge for Boeing (and Airbus, too) is more the future than the past. As long as the regulatory environment requires 2+ in the cockpit, cleansheet designs have to account for that and the possibility that 1+ will become acceptable at some point.

Until the FAA commits one way or the other, I’d say both are relatively stuck with re-engining, wingleting, and other incremental stuff on existing airframes and calling it cleansheet.
 
Sounds like the maintenance folks chased the altitude pressurization control unit for issues rather than asking what was causing it to report an error in the first place.
As a current 737 pilot, I'd don't see how the door-plug issue could have caused the pressurization controller squawks.

The 737 has two automatic pressurization controls plus the ability for the pressurization (outflow value) to be controlled manually by the pilots. The active controller alternates on each subsequent leg so that they are each primary for half of the airplane's flights.

The indication that the incident airplane had was the yellow "AUTO FAIL" light and, from the context in which it has been described, the green "ALTN" light. The combination of these two lights indicates that the primary controller has failed and the alternate controller has taken over and is working properly. If both controllers fail, you'll get the "AUTO FAIL" light WITHOUT the "ALTN" light and you'll have to revert to the manual process.

In each case, as reported by the NTSB, the alternate controller worked as designed for the remaining of the flights.

I really don't see how a loose door-plug would cause an "AUTO FAIL" condition as it would have to be leaking a significant amount of air--so much so that the airplane's outflow value would be unable to maintain pressurization. In such a case, neither controller would be able to work, nor would the manual process, and the flight would divert due to a loss of pressurization. That didn't happen. Additionally, having that much air leaking from the door-plug would have been quite loud and would not have gone unnoticed by nearby passengers and flight attendants. There have been no reports of such a noise.

When you have a foreseeable write-up, i.e. a known failure condition, the mechanics follow a troubleshooting procedure from the aircraft maintenance manual (AMM). That leads them through a process designed to determine what has caused the problem and then instructs them on how to fix it. Once the fix is applied, the system is tested. If the test fails, the troubleshooting procedure continues to additional steps.

Sometimes the ground tests pass but the problem reoccurs on a later flight. The problem appears to be fixed, but it quickly returns. That is what happened to the accident airplane and is why repeat write-ups will result in removal of the airplane's ETOPS status.

The mechanics aren't left on their own to troubleshoot the problem. There are established procedures which lead them through a logical progression to isolate the problem and identify needed repair. Problems often aren't binary in that the bad component is not working 100% of the time. This can lead to problems in the troubleshooting process as everything might work normally during troubleshooting and testing but then fail again later. This is why you sometimes end up with repeat write-ups. At this point, there is nothing to indicate that the mechanics did anything wrong in their attempts to address the "AUTO FAIL" discrepancy.

We will have to wait for more information before we'll know if the "AUTO FAIL" lights had any relationship to the loose door-plug.
 
I don't think the problem is the door/plug, specifically. I think the problem is that everyone involved in the investigation should be keeping in mind that we've already had X hundred deaths over 737 max stability system, and now we have the door, so we should be expecting something next with the same aircraft. So if they let Boeing, and max continue, what's that mean for that next accident/problem? And at a higher level, this a US problem. Are we going to let Boeing wreck the US aviation industry, and reputation of the same, further and/or forever? Along the lines of "aircraft used to be built by the US and EU and some others" to "aircraft are built by the EU, and China, and some others".

Again, not stating that this specific problem is significant enough that it's worthy of fixing Boeing. But it sure feels like a tipping point to me.

Maybe I'm reading it too harshly. Maybe we'll have some airbus problems soon, and it'll just be a reset for the industry that we have reasonably affordable and reasonably safe aircraft, and that we're not supposed to be going for perfect.

But we're headed to a point where either Boeing aircraft or 737 specifically is equivalent to saying "British electrical system" or Pinto, at least in my head. And I don't think that Boeing can fix that problem themselves.
 
But it sure feels like a tipping point to me.
I don't think so. In my industry experience, every aircraft OEM has gone through a period of incidents, accidents, and bad press. Airbus included. However, the problem that Boeing is facing where others not so much is a free press and an agenda.
In this specific incident, you've already erected the gallows yet the cause of the door failure has yet to be announced.
And yes, I would get on a Boeing product any day and twice on Sunday over an Airbus product if I have the choice.
 
I don't think so. In my industry experience, every aircraft OEM has gone through a period of incidents, accidents, and bad press. Airbus included. However, the problem that Boeing is facing where others not so much is a free press and an agenda.
In this specific incident, you've already erected the gallows yet the cause of the door failure has yet to be announced.
And yes, I would get on a Boeing product any day and twice on Sunday over an Airbus product if I have the choice.
That's a fair point. I'm viewing this as not understanding how a company can appear to be so incompetent, and how they are still pushing along such an old design. That said, I work in a different industry, IT, where that's the normal practice across the board. In IT, in order to get a better range of products you typically need a new company. Decisions day to day are done, seemingly, with a next quarter revenue outcome perspective. Significant quality improvements usually don't happen with existing companies...just my experience.

As to the angry press...even with people ready to take a shot at them, there wouldn't be a discussion if the door didn't fall off. If this had happened to a small business, they'd just be gone. That there wasn't a discussion, company wide, after trim control that "we can't afford any other screw up on max, ever" and that anyone not on board with that needs to go, doesn't make sense to me. Maybe that discussion happened, and this is just a random poor luck occurrence.

My concern is that the time to fix Boeing is now, and that I personally don't think they're capable of doing it themselves.

I'd get on a Boeing product, too, if it were US or European crewed; but if I owned an airline you'd have trouble convincing me to buy one. I would not buy a 737.
 
I don't think the problem is the door/plug, specifically. I think the problem is that everyone involved in the investigation should be keeping in mind that we've already had X hundred deaths over 737 max stability system, and now we have the door, so we should be expecting something next with the same aircraft. So if they let Boeing, and max continue, what's that mean for that next accident/problem? And at a higher level, this a US problem. Are we going to let Boeing wreck the US aviation industry, and reputation of the same, further and/or forever? Along the lines of "aircraft used to be built by the US and EU and some others" to "aircraft are built by the EU, and China, and some others".

Again, not stating that this specific problem is significant enough that it's worthy of fixing Boeing. But it sure feels like a tipping point to me.

Maybe I'm reading it too harshly. Maybe we'll have some airbus problems soon, and it'll just be a reset for the industry that we have reasonably affordable and reasonably safe aircraft, and that we're not supposed to be going for perfect.

But we're headed to a point where either Boeing aircraft or 737 specifically is equivalent to saying "British electrical system" or Pinto, at least in my head. And I don't think that Boeing can fix that problem themselves.

 
I'm viewing this as not understanding how a company can appear to be so incompetent,
I think the key word in that statement is “appear.” A negative narrative in this day and age can make any person or entity “appear” to be something it is not. Regardless, while Boeing has made some unpopular decisions over the past 10-15 years, if you dig deep enough you’ll find its not just Boeing sitting alone in bottom of the hole.
and how they are still pushing along such an old design.
Because Airbus decided first to upgrade the "old" A320 to the NEO. Boeing had a clean sheet, single aisle design on the board, but with so much at stake elected to re-engine the 737NG into the MAX vs complete the new design to compete with the NEO. We’re talking about a multi-billion dollar developing market.
 
Hardly holds a candle to the stuff that went on with MD before Boeing bought them. The stuff on the -10 was staggering.
 
...how they are still pushing along such an old design.
There seems to be this misconception that a major airplane manufacturer simply designs an airplane to fill a perceived market gap and offers it up, like, "Hey, y'all want some?" Nothing could be further from the truth. If the launch customers had wanted a clean-sheet design they would have gotten a clean-sheet design. The launch customers wanted a common type rating and largely common supply chain with their existing fleet, which is what they got. The end result was not what anyone wanted, but don't attribute that to Boeing's desire to "push along an old design" without significant pull from customers.

Nauga,
uninvolved
 
I just saw an interview that made quite the point. If we can't trust the manufacturer to tighten a bolt on the door, how can we trust they tightened other more important bolts? For once a reporter may be right.
 
And we trust reporters to get the facts straight?
 
There seems to be this misconception that a major airplane manufacturer simply designs an airplane to fill a perceived market gap and offers it up, like, "Hey, y'all want some?" Nothing could be further from the truth. If the launch customers had wanted a clean-sheet design they would have gotten a clean-sheet design. The launch customers wanted a common type rating and largely common supply chain with their existing fleet, which is what they got. The end result was not what anyone wanted, but don't attribute that to Boeing's desire to "push along an old design" without significant pull from customers.

Nauga,
uninvolved
You are exactly right. Boeing is in a pickle with the 737. They have many customers (Southwest) that want to upgrade/update their fleets with more efficient aircraft, but don't want to undertake the cost to retype their crews. Airbus has the same issue with their A320 customers. The only difference is the A320 airframe lent itself to these larger updated engines better than the original 737 airframe. Maybe by design, maybe by luck. If Boeing says sorry SWA, we need to clean sheet you an airplane, they may lose a valuable customer.
 
And we trust reporters to get the facts straight?

Not the facts in this particular instance, but at least the question. If Spirit/Boeing don't have adequate oversight of their manufacturing process of installing this door, what else have they missed? I think a valid question.
 
There seems to be this misconception that a major airplane manufacturer simply designs an airplane to fill a perceived market gap and offers it up, like, "Hey, y'all want some?" Nothing could be further from the truth. If the launch customers had wanted a clean-sheet design they would have gotten a clean-sheet design. The launch customers wanted a common type rating and largely common supply chain with their existing fleet, which is what they got. The end result was not what anyone wanted, but don't attribute that to Boeing's desire to "push along an old design" without significant pull from customers.

Nauga,
uninvolved
I'm not positive, but pretty sure that this is exactly what they did with the 747, and perhaps 707. I could be wrong, I'm going on legend here. Giving the people what they want is reactionary, and necessarily putting yourself behind the curve. It's a strategy that works if no one else is willing to take more risks. Nobody asked for the Model T, the Garand, or the airplane for that matter. Companies that lead do so by innovating, not pushing out decisions for yet another year, year after year. Long term planning is not a hallmark of 2024 US business.

Every time something happens with these, there's an outcry, and there's a lot of noise that sounds like Charlie Brown's teacher explaining why it's not a big deal.

I'm not wound up. I'm not suggesting that regulators have any ability to fix this, especially with respect to this particular issue. But I have zero faith in the ability of Boeing to un-f*(ck this, and I'm willing to bet more than lunch that we're not at the end of the line on 737 issues.
 
I'm not positive, but pretty sure that this is exactly what they did with the 747, and perhaps 707. I could be wrong, I'm going on legend here. Giving the people what they want is reactionary, and necessarily putting yourself behind the curve. It's a strategy that works if no one else is willing to take more risks. Nobody asked for the Model T, the Garand, or the airplane for that matter. Companies that lead do so by innovating, not pushing out decisions for yet another year, year after year. Long term planning is not a hallmark of 2024 US business.
If Boeing insisted on a clean-sheet design while customers demanded a common type rating with existing equipment every current operator would be flying A320 derivatives. To think otherwise is naive...or maybe that's what people want.

Nauga,
who knows what happens when you ignore customer requirements
 
There seems to be this misconception that a major airplane manufacturer simply designs an airplane to fill a perceived market gap and offers it up, like, "Hey, y'all want some?" Nothing could be further from the truth. If the launch customers had wanted a clean-sheet design they would have gotten a clean-sheet design. The launch customers wanted a common type rating and largely common supply chain with their existing fleet, which is what they got. The end result was not what anyone wanted, but don't attribute that to Boeing's desire to "push along an old design" without significant pull from customers.

Nauga,
uninvolved
Can I “Like” this more than once?
 
Hardly holds a candle to the stuff that went on with MD before Boeing bought them. The stuff on the -10 was staggering.

Much of Boeing's downward slide began with the infiltration of McDAC management into Boeing's executive offices after the acquistion. Anybody remember Gus Grissom and the Liberty Bell 7's door departure? Yep, MD built that space capsule.

The legacy continues.....
:)
 
I'm not saying it's either easy or without risk, and I don't see it as either/or. Based on the range and capacity of the majority of the 737 fleet, figure out how to design something new to meet that, plus an area above or below it that they can sell. Figure out how to minimize the training required for a type cert for any pilot, not just those used to 737.

Making the easy and low risk decisions in the short term, in business, often ends up in a situation where those challenges reappear with higher impact later on. On a day to day basis, on a micro level, all of these things are easy to justify. Then at some point it becomes clear that the gradual decline over 20+ years has led to a point that's not recoverable.

Another way to look at it is to assume the opposite, and try to say with a straight face "They're fine. Doing well. All makes sense, nothing to be concerned about here, just a minor course correction." Again.
 
If Boeing insisted on a clean-sheet design while customers demanded a common type rating with existing equipment every current operator would be flying A320 derivatives. To think otherwise is naive...or maybe that's what people want.

Nauga,
who knows what happens when you ignore customer requirements


OTOH, those customers could have bought Airbuses. Boeing re-used the 737 design because it was the only way they could be cost-competitive with Airbus. And along the way, Boeing ignored warnings and shoved lots of their dirt under the rug. If you haven't already, read the book Flying Blind and you'll get some understanding of just how rancid the culture at Boeing has become.

 
On a day to day basis, on a micro level, all of these things are easy to justify. Then at some point it becomes clear that the gradual decline over 20+ years has led to a point that's not recoverable.

Can I "Like" this more than once?
 
If Boeing says sorry SWA, we need to clean sheet you an airplane, they may lose a valuable customer.
FYI: it was a much larger market than SWA. It was an international market across dozens of countries. SWA simply had the right business model to take advantage of that exploding overseas market. And just to add, Boeing did lose AA to the NEO which sparked the move to the MAX.
I could be wrong, I'm going on legend here.
In this case you’re wrong. Different market and legend. Airbus had already screwed the pooch with their “long term planning” on the A380. And you saw how that ended. Boeing eclipsed them with their “long term planning” offer the 787.

However, in the short term, when Airbus responded to the exploding single aisle market in Asia and similar areas with the NEO it light a fire under Boeing to catch up. No clean sheet, ie, innovative design, could compete on the same time schedule.

So the move was to the MAX. The only problem was the 737 had short landing gear vs the 320’s higher gear length which was designed for a different era of pax loading/unloading. Unfortunately, that short gear led to the MCAS requirement and the rest is history.

You can blame Boeing all you want, but they are hardly the only hole in the block of Swiss cheese to line up and cause the issues of the MAX. And to include the door plug falling out if those 4 bolts were actually missing.
 
I just saw an interview that made quite the point. If we can't trust the manufacturer to tighten a bolt on the door, how can we trust they tightened other more important bolts? For once a reporter may be right.
Assuming there's some hierarchy of importance to bolts and these were of low importance, would you expect them to pay more or less attention to the "more important bolts"?
 
If <Pick An Aircraft Manufacturer> don't have adequate oversight of their manufacturing process of installing this <random component>, what else have they missed? I think a valid question.
I agree. But if you’re gonna fly, you’re kinda stuck.
 
They have many customers (Southwest) that want to upgrade/update their fleets with more efficient aircraft, but don't want to undertake the cost to retype their crews.
Boeing was intending to go with a clean sheet design. It was American's order that push it to re-engine the 737. The customers wanted the efficiency of the Airbus neo series years earlier than a clean sheet design could be built.

From Wikipedia:
In 2006, Boeing started considering the replacement of the 737 with a "clean sheet" design that could follow the Boeing 787 Dreamliner.[13] In June 2010, a decision on this replacement was postponed until 2011.[14]

On December 1, 2010, Boeing's competitor, Airbus, launched the Airbus A320neo family to improve fuel economy and operating efficiency with new engines: the LEAP from CFM International and the PW1000G from Pratt & Whitney.[15] In February 2011, Boeing CEO Jim McNerney said, "We're going to do a new airplane."[16] At the time, the company had been developing a new aircraft to replace the 737 as part of its Yellowstone Project.[17][18] In March 2011, Boeing Commercial Airplanes President James Albaugh told participants of a trade meeting that the company was not sure about a 737 re-engine, as Boeing CFO James A. Bell had said at an investor conference the same month.[19] The Airbus A320neo gathered 667 commitments at the June 2011 Paris Air Show bringing its order backlog to 1,029 units, setting an order record for a new commercial airliner.[20]

On July 20, 2011, American Airlines announced an order for 460 narrowbody jets including 130 A320ceo (current engine option), 130 A320neo, 100 737NG and intended to order 100 re-engined 737s with CFM LEAP if Boeing pursued the project.[21] The order broke Boeing's long-time monopoly with American.[22]

Faced with the news of record orders for Airbus and the defection of a long-time loyal customer, on August 30, 2011, Boeing's board of directors approved the launch of the re-engined 737,
 
I'm not saying it's either easy or without risk, and I don't see it as either/or. Based on the range and capacity of the majority of the 737 fleet, figure out how to design something new to meet that, plus an area above or below it that they can sell. Figure out how to minimize the training required for a type cert for any pilot, not just those used to 737.
And figure out how to all this and reach the customer's cost goal. Had what you want been achievable by *any* major airframer that airframer would have delivered it. There's a reason the predominant single-aisle airframe types in today's 121 ops are derivatives.

Nauga,
and the cost of that new plane smell
 
You can blame Boeing all you want, but they are hardly the only hole in the block of Swiss cheese to line up and cause the issues of the MAX. And to include the door plug falling out if those 4 bolts were actually missing.
Very true, but not necessarily obvious to the outside observer. There is no excusing the severity of the issues with the Max - and it's also easy to forget that not all that long ago Airbus was being raked over the coals what people perceived as their poor flight control strategies, over-reliance on automation, and flawed fly by wire logic that all resulted in loss of life. Yet here we are.

Nauga,
and the inevitables
 
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