737 Max cleared to fly again

Just in time for the big explosion in ridership.

...oh, wait...
 
This will be as significant to the Boeing as the 747 or the 707, except in the other direction. Don't know if Boeing will recover its reputation, let alone the finances from this mess.
 
WDD said:
This will be as significant to the Boeing as the 747 or the 707, except in the other direction. Don't know if Boeing will recover its reputation, let alone the finances from this mess.
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Strongly agree, especially when the Boeing Starliner (space capsule) and the junk left inside the fuel tanks of Boeing planes is added into the mix.
 
IMHO Boeing went off the rails years ago when it moved the Corp headquarters / the CEO relocated to Chicago away from the manufacturing. Wanted to be next to United. In reality the CEO wanted a flashier city to live in. Got away from the core mission of engineering and building airplanes.
 
WDD said:
This will be as significant to the Boeing as the 747 or the 707, except in the other direction. Don't know if Boeing will recover its reputation, let alone the finances from this mess.
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Meh, people have short memories. They won't even remember what the issue with the 737 Max was in a few years. I think enough of the aircraft manufacturers are reeling from the pandemic impacts that none of them are in particularly amazing shape. Boeing will probably get "pandemic bailout" funding that covers up some of the 737MAX sins.
 
Boeing's HQ move to Chicago from Seattle was also a shot across the bow to Washington State/Seattle who treated Boeing like a tax cash cow. Also WA refused to effectively address the coming highway gridlock (which long ago was realized) by building roads, and instead committed to a tens of billions of dollars light rail choo-choo train project which will not affect highway congestion at all.

WA State and Seattle did not get the message and Boeing has been slowly transitioning manufacturing to more friendly shores.

Boeing accurately read the tea leaves on the future decline of the so-called Great Pacific Northwest. Would I have preferred Boeing HQ remain in Seattle? Of course. But just like an individual, you can't blame a company for removing itself from an abusive relationship.
 
126306405_10157259287282735_8968528905865317354_n.jpg
 
Domenick said:
Boeing's HQ move to Chicago from Seattle was also a shot across the bow to Washington State/Seattle who treated Boeing like a tax cash cow. Also WA refused to effectively address the coming highway gridlock (which long ago was realized) by building roads, and instead committed to a tens of billions of dollars light rail choo-choo train project which will not affect highway congestion at all.

WA State and Seattle did not get the message and Boeing has been slowly transitioning manufacturing to more friendly shores.

Boeing accurately read the tea leaves on the future decline of the so-called Great Pacific Northwest. Would I have preferred Boeing HQ remain in Seattle? Of course. But just like an individual, you can't blame a company for removing itself from an abusive relationship.
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That's interesting. I know nothing about the tax structure Boeing was dealing with in Seattle but it must have been pretty bad if a move to Illinois was better!
 
AlphaMike said:
That's interesting. I know nothing about the tax structure Boeing was dealing with in Seattle but it must have been pretty bad if a move to Illinois was better!
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AFAIK, they aren’t moving any manufacturing to IL.

Cheers
 
Yes but as someone who was born and raised in IL - moving anything to IL is tough, especially these days.

I would have thought Dallas, Atlanta, something like that. I’ve heard that Nashville is now up and coming for relocation places.

My point was that Boeing seems to have gotten away from hard core engineering and too much toward cash cowing whatever they had already. The Starliner mess is I think another example of taking the eye off of the engineering ball
 
Boeing's decline started in 1997 when it merged with MD. MD's CEO, Stonecipher, became President and COO of the "New" Boeing. Stonecipher rose to CEO in 2004.

Until that time, from Bill Boeing to Phil Condit (1916-2003), Boeing had promoted from within.
 
Domenick said:
MD's CEO, Stonecipher, became President and COO of the "New" Boeing. Stonecipher rose to CEO in 2004
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This never made sense to me. Why you would promote the leader of a company that had proven itself incapable of staying competitive is bananas. DC-10/MD-11 showed that they were missing out on what Boeing and Airbus already figured out.. that efficient twin jet planes were the way to go
 
Had a few dealings with Stonechipher on the C-17 program. Real Hard Ass until the USAF almost canceled the Program and he got a bit more reasonable. Never really understood how he maneuvered into the job at Boeing but not my circus, not my monkeys.

Cheers
 
Fro what I read -
Software mostly.
Easier to override
Training - telling pilots it is actually there to start with
Not relying on only 1 sensor that would be in error, etc.

More I’m sure
 
Matthew said:
Anyone know the details on what the fix actually did?
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Here's a snippet from the AD (which you can find here):

As proposed in the NPRM, the corrective actions mandated by this AD include a revision of the airplane’s flight control laws (software). The new flight control laws now require inputs from both AOA sensors in order to activate MCAS. They also compare the inputs from the two sensors, and if those inputs differ significantly (greater than 5.5 degrees for a specified period of time), will disable the Speed Trim System (STS), which includes MCAS, for the remainder of the flight and provide a corresponding indication of that deactivation on the flight deck. The new flight control laws now permit only one activation of MCAS per sensed high-AOA event, and limit the magnitude of any MCAS command to move the horizontal stabilizer such that the resulting position of the stabilizer will preserve the flightcrew’s ability to control the airplane’s pitch by using only the control column. This means the pilot will have sufficient control authority without the need to make electric or manual stabilizer trim inputs. The new flight control laws also include FCC integrity monitoring of each FCC’s performance and cross-FCC monitoring, which detects and stops erroneous FCC-generated stabilizer trim commands (including MCAS).

This AD further mandates changes to the airplane’s AFM to add and revise flightcrew procedures to facilitate the crew’s ability to recognize and respond to undesired horizontal stabilizer movement and the effects of a potential AOA sensor failure.

This AD also mandates an AOA DISAGREE alert, which indicates certain AOA sensor failures or a significant calibration issue. The alert is implemented by revision of MDS software; as a result, certain stickers (known as INOP markers) will be removed.

Additionally, this AD mandates adequately separating certain airplane wiring, and conducting an AOA sensor system test and an operational readiness flight on each airplane before the airplane is reintroduced to service.

Finally, this AD requires that operators that wish to dispatch airplanes with certain inoperative systems must first have incorporated specific provisions that are more restrictive into their existing FAA-approved MEL.
 
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Domenick said:
Boeing's decline started in 1997 when it merged with MD. MD's CEO, Stonecipher, became President and COO of the "New" Boeing. Stonecipher rose to CEO in 2004.

Until that time, from Bill Boeing to Phil Condit (1916-2003), Boeing had promoted from within.
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This was a great decision by Boeing!

This decision is what led Alan Mulally to Ford. Best CEO we have ever had!
 
kayoh190 said:
Here's a snippet from the AD (which you can find here):

As proposed in the NPRM, the corrective actions mandated by this AD include a revision of the airplane’s flight control laws (software). The new flight control laws now require inputs from both AOA sensors in order to activate MCAS. They also compare the inputs from the two sensors, and if those inputs differ significantly (greater than 5.5 degrees for a specified period of time), will disable the Speed Trim System (STS), which includes MCAS, for the remainder of the flight and provide a corresponding indication of that deactivation on the flight deck. The new flight control laws now permit only one activation of MCAS per sensed high-AOA event, and limit the magnitude of any MCAS command to move the horizontal stabilizer such that the resulting position of the stabilizer will preserve the flightcrew’s ability to control the airplane’s pitch by using only the control column. This means the pilot will have sufficient control authority without the need to make electric or manual stabilizer trim inputs. The new flight control laws also include FCC integrity monitoring of each FCC’s performance and cross-FCC monitoring, which detects and stops erroneous FCC-generated stabilizer trim commands (including MCAS).

This AD further mandates changes to the airplane’s AFM to add and revise flightcrew procedures to facilitate the crew’s ability to recognize and respond to undesired horizontal stabilizer movement and the effects of a potential AOA sensor failure.

This AD also mandates an AOA DISAGREE alert, which indicates certain AOA sensor failures or a significant calibration issue. The alert is implemented by revision of MDS software; as a result, certain stickers (known as INOP markers) will be removed.

Additionally, this AD mandates adequately separating certain airplane wiring, and conducting an AOA sensor system test and an operational readiness flight on each airplane before the airplane is reintroduced to service.

Finally, this AD requires that operators that wish to dispatch airplanes with certain inoperative systems must first have incorporated specific provisions that are more restrictive into their existing FAA-approved MEL.
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Looks like a lot more software bandaids to cover up a poor design. I wonder with all those changes if it will not increase the likelihood of control problems with the aircraft that the MCAS was designed to deal with but could now be rendered inoperative? Something tells me this story isn't over and we may see new problems with the Max going forward; hope I am wrong.
 
FlyingTiger said:
Looks like a lot more software bandaids to cover up a poor design. I wonder with all those changes if it will not increase the likelihood of control problems with the aircraft that the MCAS was designed to deal with but could now be rendered inoperative? Something tells me this story isn't over and we may see new problems with the Max going forward; hope I am wrong.
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Just like we see problems with all the fly-by-wire fighter airplanes and most Airbus planes?
 
How many people here have actually seen the control software design and implementation?

(and, no, I haven't)
 
When I bought my Sport Cub from CubCrafters (the other Washington airplane manufacturer) in 2007, it was serial number 62. On a visit to the factory a year or so later I met the owner of serial number 61 -- Scott Carson, then CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes. Here he is with his dad, long-time Boeing test pilot "Kit" Carson, and Becky Teerink of CubCrafters.

P1070810.jpg

Scott's Cub had a custom red paint job with the Washington State University Cougars logo on the tail. He still has it.
 
RyanShort1 said:
Just like we see problems with all the fly-by-wire fighter airplanes and most Airbus planes?
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There were and continue to be software related crashes in fighters at a rate that would get any commercial airliner grounded permanently. The airbuses have had multiple crashes related to software.
 
Jeff767 said:
There were and continue to be software related crashes in fighters at a rate that would get any commercial airliner grounded permanently. The airbuses have had multiple crashes related to software.
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Control augmentation and envelope protection is becoming more and more prevalent in large transports. As this trend continues, what do you think the leading cause of accidents is?

Nauga,
and wetware
 
I don’t have an issue with computer assisted control. It gives me pause to think of computer assisted control to overcome an inherent instability brought in by bad design.
 
WDD said:
I don’t have an issue with computer assisted control. It gives me pause to think of computer assisted control to overcome an inherent instability brought in by bad design.
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1) The 37 MAX is not unstable, and 2) Instability in and of itself is not always the result of "bad design", there are reasons for intentionally designing for instability and overcoming it with augmentation.

Nauga,
hooked
 
nauga said:
1) The 37 MAX is not unstable, and 2) Instability in and of itself is not always the result of "bad design", there are reasons for intentionally designing for instability and overcoming it with augmentation.

Nauga,
hooked
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I’m thinking of how the new engines are so large they are pushed forward, and the center of thrust is different than what the wing and airframe was designed for with the original engines. Thus the reason for the new MCAS.
 
The reason for mcas was to maintain the same type, not due to instability. This was driven by airline requirements to not have to train pilots on a new type, and Boeing listened to its customers.
 
WDD said:
I’m thinking of how the new engines are so large they are pushed forward, and the center of thrust is different than what the wing and airframe was designed for with the original engines. Thus the reason for the new MCAS.
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I'm well aware of the reasons behind MCAS. It's not really an instability per se, but #2 in the post you responded to is still applicable.

Nauga,
and the cost of clean sheets
 
Jeff767 said:
There were and continue to be software related crashes in fighters at a rate that would get any commercial airliner grounded permanently. The airbuses have had multiple crashes related to software.
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My point is that it's a double, and arbitrary, standard... and those bashing Boeing for a fly-by-wire system aren't making the same argument w/regards to Airbus. It's blatantly political.
 
RyanShort1 said:
My point is that it's a double, and arbitrary, standard... and those bashing Boeing for a fly-by-wire system aren't making the same argument w/regards to Airbus. It's blatantly political.
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I don't think it's political, I think it's based on what's top-of-page in recent news and a shiny lure for flawed "analysis."

Nauga,
and some good old fashioned blamestorming
 
Bell206 said:
FYI: the MCAS was designed and installed in the MAX to only meet a Part 25 certification requirement not to correct any control problems.
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Really, so MCAS serves no real purpose in stabilizing the aircraft? Then what does it do; why does it exist? I suggest you read about the development of the MAX and why the system was required by the FAA to get it's Airworthiness Certificate. In summary, Boeing decided to hammer a square peg into a round hole called the 737 type and in doing so created an aircraft that is unstable under certain conditions due to the engine placement as noted above by WDD.
 
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