737 down off Honolulu

Doc Holliday said:
There’s no rush to secure the engine, and more than adequate time to identify a failed/failing engine.

This seems to be a rush at getting a checklist and rush to shut down the engine.
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Meh. Looks just the opposite to me. Speed in identifying and securing the engine would have been better due to it being a partial power loss. By reducing power on both engines there was no asymmetrical yaw. Give me "Dead foot, dead engine", but that means both thrust levers full forward to tell. This is from the report https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/103407/pdf :

The captain subsequently stated, “let’s see what is the problem...which one...what's going on with the gauges,” and “who has the E-G-T [exhaust gas temperature]?” The first officer stated that the left engine was “gone” and “so we have number two” (the right engine), thus misidentifying the affected engine. The captain accepted the first officer’s assessment and did not take action to verify the information. Afterward, the EPR level on the right engine began to increase in response to the captain advancing the right thrust lever so that the airplane could maintain airspeed and altitude. Right EPR increased and decreased several times during the rest of the flight (coinciding with crew comments regarding the EGT on the right engine and low airspeed) while the left EPR remained near flight idle.
​
The left engine was never shut down even though they mistakenly thought it was the failed one. Running both levers all the way forward would have told the story both with their feet and eyes on the EGTs. They were so consumed with trying to run checklists and follow company procedures and were confused by the high EGT on the engine they mistakenly thought was the good one that they couldn't even get through the steps to shut down the wrong engine before they hit the water. There are times to throw the book out the window, in the middle of this mess was one of them, imo.

EDIT: @DaveInPA, @Mongoose Aviator and @midwestpa24 : This being a transport category airplane, there is no "blue line". Consequently, they ditched with the stick shaker actuating instead of chasing a blue line into the water. Same kind of problem (partial power loss) can arise in a light twin with the loss of a turbo-charger.
 
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Let'sgoflying! said:
Yet, we have 10,000hr, 20,000hr pilots with all those years of training from multiple sources who can’t get it right.

A person could post how they will handle it, what the training and manuals say till they are blue in the face and you know what? It’s going to happen again. And again. In the next year or three.

We continue to miss something on OEI that goes beyond training and is ignoring the human factor.

We need a different approach.

i think there are probably some tech geniuses out there that could come up with something to help with the cockpit display that makes it glaringly obvious “which engine “. We need to have some way to take the helmet fire out of the equation.

Last time I suggested change the backward-looking, old-school crowd blasted me; they knew better, there was no problem.
I knew it was going to happen again and just shut up.

Has anything changed; is anyone interested in addressing the problem, proposing & discussing ideas?
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You can change the procedures, the training, the technology, a thousand times and people will still duck it up. Is your contention that this happens a lot? What is your definition of a lot? What would we have to get that number down to for you to think enough is being done?
 
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Let'sgoflying! said:
We need a different approach.

i think there are probably some tech geniuses out there that could come up with something to help with the cockpit display that makes it glaringly obvious “which engine “. We need to have some way to take the helmet fire out of the equation.
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They were flying an airplane certified in the 1960s, not even sure human factors was a term back then. Not much you can do to change the past. My airplane was designed 30 years ago and will display a message such as "ENG1 OUT" or "ENG1 LOW N1" on the EICAS.

Let'sgoflying! said:
Last time I suggested change the backward-looking, old-school crowd blasted me; they knew better, there was no problem.
I knew it was going to happen again and just shut up.
Has anything changed; is anyone interested in addressing the problem, proposing & discussing ideas?
Click to expand...

Procedures have already evolved over the past 60 years. This particular airline either has a poor procedure, poor training, or a crew that did not follow their training for whatever reason. Regardless, I doubt anywhere here works for Transair or would have the power to change anything, so don't think you're going to accomplish anything by airing your opinion here.
 
USAF C5 Dover, DE 2006

“Our crews are thoroughly and stringently trained on a continued basis to handle events in the aircraft,"

https://www.dover.af.mil/News/Article/231056/seventeen-people-recover-after-surviving-c-5-crash/


“The accident investigators found the crew then shut down the No. 2 engine and erroneously put the No. 3 engine, the one closest to the fuselage on the right side of the aircraft, in idle.“


https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/accident/2016/04/05/dafb-at-75-decade-has/64604271007/

this is no way a disparagement of the crews; in fact I have the strongest of empathy for them. Again, this is about “we can’t train our way out of this recurring problem”, we need new ideas.
 
Many more.
Tired now.
Tired of the apathy, refusal to recognize a problem.
/effort.
 
Let'sgoflying! said:
Tired of the apathy, refusal to recognize a problem.
/effort.
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Tell me you don't really expect that your, er, expressions of anguish (as expressed on POA) will make any difference to the aviation world.

Here are some practical ideas: (unless of course you prefer to feel like a neglected voice of reason)

Perhaps you should go to the news channel and talk about how you've been ignored, and get them to interview the FAA, NTSB, Boeing, Airbus, even Congress to get to why you're being ignored. That might get you some traction in your quest.

Perhaps go back to school for aviation engineering so that you can join Boeing or Airbus and implement your changes.

Perhaps join the FAA so you can work your way to the top and decree your changes.

Perhaps become a member of congress so you can legislate your changes.



Good luck on your quest.
 
Let'sgoflying! said:
Yet, we have 10,000hr, 20,000hr pilots with all those years of training from multiple sources who can’t get it right.

A person could post how they will handle it, what the training and manuals say till they are blue in the face and you know what? It’s going to happen again. And again. In the next year or three.

We continue to miss something on OEI that goes beyond training and is ignoring the human factor.

We need a different approach.

i think there are probably some tech geniuses out there that could come up with something to help with the cockpit display that makes it glaringly obvious “which engine “. We need to have some way to take the helmet fire out of the equation.

Last time I suggested change the backward-looking, old-school crowd blasted me; they knew better, there was no problem.
I knew it was going to happen again and just shut up.

Has anything changed; is anyone interested in addressing the problem, proposing & discussing ideas?
Click to expand...

I think it was Gulfstream a few years ago was certifying a new plane. During the simulation testing, they found if they fully compensated for the failed engine automatically, there was a high correlation to the pilots shutting down the wrong engine. The result, the production system did not automatically fully compensate for the engine failure.

Tim
 
tspear said:
I think it was Gulfstream a few years ago was certifying a new plane. During the simulation testing, they found if they fully compensated for the failed engine automatically, there was a high correlation to the pilots shutting down the wrong engine. The result, the production system did not automatically fully compensate for the engine failure.

Tim
Click to expand...

It's wasn't just Gulfstream ;)

nauga said:
In highly-augmented airplanes we have had the ability to make engine failure completely transparent to the the crew (in terms of handling, not performance) for years. We found that performance was greatly improved by having *some* 'traditional' cues still noticeable to make it easier to determine which engine had failed. So here's an example where the maximum authority of 'automation' is not used to improve crew performance.
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Nauga,
footing it
 
Excepting maybe smoke in the cockpit or rapid decompression, it ought to go:
(Master Warning/Caution light flashing):
Fly the Plane, then:
1. Wind your watch.
2. Order coffee.
3. PNF gets appropriate checklist/QRH.
 
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